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Abstract
Successful translation of scientific discovery into new medicines is most successful with
collaboration between academics - scientists and physicians - and industry. In recent years, there
has been increasing concern at academic medical centers about the impact of relationships with
industry on patient care and student education. This has generally resulted in more stringent
conflict-of-interest rules. This paper seeks to better understand the impact of these conflict-of-
interest rules. In the first part, it explores research to-date on the importance of relationships
between industry and academia and discusses some of the concerns that have arisen. In the
second part, this relationship is better characterized with clinical trial data. The findings suggest
that there is a strong trend towards schools with higher conflict-of-interest rules having fewer
clinical trials. This suggests that although there may be benefits to stricter regulation, there are
trade-offs in terms of clinical translation.
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1. Introduction
In the healthcare industry, progress in finding new treatments is spurred by close
collaboration between industry, and academia. Unfortunately, such arrangements can create
conflicts-of-interest. As a consequence, numerous entities, including academic medical centers,
states, and government and physician bodies have stated and implemented guidance to restrict
the interaction of industry representatives with physicians.
This paper evaluates the impact of conflict-of-interest (COI) restrictions at academic medical
centers (AMCs) on innovation in the life sciences, as measured by clinical trials. Informing the
controversy regarding conflict-of-interest, I analyze whether and to what extent these policies
influence the translation of research into the clinic.
1.1 History of Industry Collaborations with Academia
It is important to recognize that industry and academic institutions have a long history,
with both sides recognizing that close industry-academic ties facilitate translation of scientific
research into clinical innovations. For instance, in the 1920s Eli Lilly worked with academics at
the University of Toronto to manufacture insulin; the university then issued royalty-free patents
to other companies to extend the drug's availability (NRC).
These interactions were spurred by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and the birth of
biotechnology in the 1990s. In the 1990s, industry ties were widespread, with one study finding
that 60% of department chairs at academic medical centers had relationships with industry
(usually serving as a consultant or member of an advisory board) (Blumenthal 1996). A survey
among faculty in the 50 most research intensive universities found that 28% of respondents
received some research support from industrial sources, and 43% received research related gifts
independent of research grants. Likewise, senior administrators and academic leaders often have
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financial interest in companies whose products and services are related to their responsibilities
(Campbell 2004a).
Universities have been increasing their commercial activities. From 1991 to 2000
universities became more active in commercializing technology, with patent applications and
licenses approximately tripling (from 1,033 patents to 3,643, and 907 licenses to 2,343).
(Campbell 2004b) From 1976 to 2003, the number of patents granted to medical faculty
increased from 122 to 2,175, and the share of medical patents out of all patents increased from
29% to 53% (Azoulay 2007). Universities with a technology transfer office increased from 25 in
1980 to 200 in 1990, and by 2000 "virtually every US university had such an office" (Bulut and
Moschini 2006).
Concurrently, the share of industry funding relative to government funding has been
increasing, from 27 percent in 1999 to 43 percent in 2002 (White 2007). In the early 1990s, more
than 90 percent of life science companies paid for a service rendered by a university, usually via
consulting agreements with faculty. More than half also sponsored research projects. Blumenthal
et al. estimated that the life science industry spent more than $1.5 billion on over 6,000 research
projects in 1994, out of a total of $12.8 billion in funding (11.7 percent) (Blumenthal 1996). A
search of registered drug trials in 2010 found that 63% were primarily funded by industry
(Bourgeois 2010).
While concerns about medical marketing are not new (e.g. when Merck's Manual of the
Materia Medica was published in 1899 one reviewer wrote "[a]lthough this little book is gotten
out by a manufacturing firm and with some view towards its advertising value, it nonetheless is
of such merit that it is deserving of mention" (quoted by Lane and Berkow [1999, p. 112] in
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NRC)), the growth of industry academic collaborations have brought heightened scrutiny to their
interactions, and potential conflicts of interest created.
"The interest is exponentially more now than it was five years ago, which was exponentially
more than it was five years before that."
-- Richard Krugman, who has served as dean of the University of Colorado School of
Medicine for 20 years (O'Connor 2010)
1.2 Conflicts of Interest
As physicians have many roles, their interactions with industry can create a number of conflicts-
of-interest, or occasions when financial ties might influence their decision making in other areas.
The National Research Council's Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, Education, and
Practice lays out the following five forms of conflicts-of-interest:
- Biomedical Research: represent the dichotomy between academic openness and
industrial secrets; e.g. researchers are discouraged from publishing results by industry
sponsors, researchers are accredited to papers they don't spend sufficient time reviewing,
or even ghostwrite, etc.
- Medical Education: occasions with industry gives gifts (e.g. free lunches) to medical
students or continuing medical education, with the risk that physicians feel the need to
reciprocate by prescribing their products.
- Institutional Conflicts of Interest: gifts given to a medical center by companies (e.g.
related to the research conducted there), as well as personal conflicts of interest by senior
officials in the administration.
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- Clinical Practice Guidelines: physicians involved in drafting guidelines have financial
ties to industry, perhaps as consultants
- Patient Care: legislation on the state level is most concerned with risks of industry
involvement impacting patient care. This concern is that physicians will be motivated to
prescribe products due to gifts or lucrative contracts.
However, it may be more helpful to conceptualize this as a continuum:
Figure 1: Continuum of Conflict of Interest, with Selected Examples
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1.3 Conflict of Interest Regulation
There are many different ways and levels in which the conflicts-of-interest discussed
above are regulated, including by industry, government bodies, state and federal legislation and
academic medical centers.
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Industry
Industry has sought to proactively self-regulate itself. In 2002, the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), which represents research-based
pharmaceutical companies, created a Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals (to
regulate interactions with marketed products and pre-launch activities), and Principles on
Conduct of Clinical Trials and Communication of Clinical Trial Results (for interactions with
clinical investigators and researchers). The former code was updated and enhanced in 2009
(PhRMA). Likewise, the Medical Device Technology Association (Advamed) created a Code of
Ethics on Interactions with Health Care Providers in 2004, and updated it in 2009 (Advamed).
Government Regulation
The National Institutes of Health provide important funding for researchers and
clinicians. More stringent conflict-of-interest legislation has been passed by the NIH, requiring
that investigators report financial interests over $5,000 to their institution and the institution
describes the conflict of interest and how it is addressed to the NIH (Silverman 2011). According
to the Office of Management and Budget, the new policy will cost 25% more than the 1995
regulations, and implementing the public disclosure will cost $350,000 (Ledford 2011).
In addition, state legislation of medical marketing began in 1992 in Minnesota, and by
2010 eight states and the District of Columbia have legislation. In addition to state legislation,
national legislation was passed with the Affordable Care Act: the Physician Payment Sunshine
Act requires that payments over $10 to physicians from manufacturers of pharmaceuticals or
medical devices be reported. This collection was supposed to begin January 1, 2012 but has been
delayed to at least January 1, 2013 as CMS prepares to implement this. (Sullivan 2012)
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Academic Medical Centers
In addition, academic medical centers typically have conflict of interest policies.
According to the American Medical Student Association (AMSA) which grades medical schools
on their conflict-of-interest policies, as of March 7, 2012, 91% of medical schools have at least
some conflict-of-interest policy, and 67% were rated as having model policy or good progress to
model policies considering gifts, consulting relationships, speaking relationships, disclosure,
pharmaceutical samples, formularies, industry sales reps, educational activities, compensation
for travel, scholarships, and medical school curriculum. For example on the sales rep score, to
receive a "model policy" score, industry sales representatives (pharmaceuticals and devices)
must not be allowed to meet with faculty or market products in an academic medical center
(AMSA).
Table 1: Timeline of Events Relevant to Conflict-of-Interest Policies (adapted from NRC)
1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act passed, prohibiting federal Patient Care
commerce in adulterated or misbranded food or drugs
(precursor to FDA)
1972 The U.S. Congress passes the first antikickback statute (P.L. Patient Care
92-603)
1980 Patent and Trademark Amendments of 1980 (P.L. 96-517) Biomedical
(Bayh-Dole Act) and Stevenson-Wydler Technology Research
Innovation Act (P.L. 96-480) encourage the
commercial development of federally developed or funded
technologies
1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-34) provides a Biomedical
25 percent tax credit for 65 percent of private investments in Research
universities for basic research
1987 U.S. Public Health Services (PHS) issues Grants Policy Biomedical
Statement, which states that grant recipients should have Research
written guidelines on conflict of interest Accreditation
Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME) adopts
Guidelines for Commercial Support (revised and issued as
standards in 1992)
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1990 A U.S. House Committee on Government Operations report
(Are Scientific Misconduct and Conflicts of Interest
Hazardous to Our Health?) recommends the development of
PHS regulations that "clearly restrict financial ties for
researchers who conduct evaluations of a product or treatment
in which they
have a vested interest" Association of American Medical
Colleges publishes Guidelines for Dealing with Faculty
Conflicts of Commitment and Conflicts of Interest in Research
American Medical Association (AMA) adopts statement on
inappropriate gifts to physicians from industry American
College of Physicians issues a position paper on physicians
and the pharmaceutical industry.
Biomedical
Research
1993 Minnesota law limits drug company gifts to physicians and Patient Care
requires company disclosure of payments to physicians
(excluding drug samples and educational materials)
1995 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Investigator Biomedical
Financial Disclosure Policy takes effect,"to help ensure the Research
appropriate management of actual or potential conflicts". This
require that institutions receive NSF and NIH funding
maintain a policy on conflict-of-interest, which include
financial disclosure and enforcement mechanisms. (NSF,
Sullivan 2011)
1999 The death of Jesse Gelsinger in a gene transfer experiment Institutional;
provokes controversy after it is revealed that the principal Biomedical
investigator and his university had ownership interests in the Research
company making the interventional product
ICMJE publishes new, more stringent policies on conflict of Biomedical
interest, requiring that authors on trials to sign a statement Research
accepting full responsibility for the trial and describing the
role taken by the sponsor as well as the author. (Davidoff)
2001 Vermont requires pharmaceutical companies to disclose Patient Care
payments to doctors and certain health care organizations
related to marketing activities
To promote adherence to its ethical guidelines, AMA, with Patient Care
funding from industry, initiates the campaign "What you
should know about gifts to physicians from industry"
The U.S. Congress questions NIH about the apparent failure Biomedical
of dozens of employees to disclose relationships with industry Research
NIH issues stringent new policies for employees and later Biomedical
2004 moderates them; HHS issues final guidance to institutional Research;
review boards on financial relationships in clinical trials Patient Care
Maine and West Virginia both require pharmaceutical Patient Care
companies to disclose advertising and marketing costs
California passes Comprehensive Compliance Program, Patient Care2005 requiring pharmaceutical companies to specify a maximum
13
2. Debate and Research Question
Conflict-of-interest regulations have lately been a hot topic of debate. Recent arguments have
mostly focused around the risks of such relationships. However, there has also been evidence to
suggest that such collaborations can create value.
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marketing expenditure per physician, and disclose costs of all
marketing activities.
The U.S. Department of Justice announces deferred Patient Care
prosecution or nonprosecution agreements that allow five
orthopedic device companies to avoid criminal prosecution
2007 for providing financial inducements for surgeons to use theirproducts.
Nevada passes Marketing Code of Conduct Law, which Patient Care
requires pharmaceutical manufacturers to accept a Code of
Conduct, including disclosure of marketing expenses.
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America Patient Care
releases revised Code on Interactions with Healthcare
Professionals and recommends an end to some gift-giving
practices
The Advanced Medical Technology Association issues Patient Care
2008 revised Code of Ethics
Massachusetts limits gifts and payments to physicians from Patient Care
pharmaceutical and device companies and requires companies
to publicly disclose certain payments
Washington DC requires pharmaceutical representatives to be Patient Care
licensed, and implements punishments for misleading
marketing.
Federal legislation proposed to require disclosure of company Patient Care
payments to physicians and others and reporting of physician
2009 ownership interests in health care facilitiesVermont extended its previous disclosure legislation to Patient Care
include medical device manufacturers. In addition, it
implemented a gift ban.
Physician Payment Sunshine Act requires that payments over Patient Care
2010 $10 to physicians from manufacturers of pharmaceuticals or
medical devices be reported (beginning 2013)
2.1 Risks of Industry-Academic Relationships
The healthcare industry is a big business in the United States. In 2009, the US spent $300
billion on prescription drugs, and another $200 billion in medical devices (Weiss 2010). In
addition, these costs have been rising. As the share of GDP devoted to healthcare spending
increases, there is growing concern over industry's influence on decision making. In 2004, the
pharmaceutical industry spent $7 billion on marketing to physicians (Cardelli 2006); A 2009
article estimated that drug and device manufacturers spent on average about $20,000 per doctor
each year in marketing efforts (meals, gifts, travel, consulting fees and CME programs) (Weiss
2010). Consequently, it is not surprising that there is public concern about marketing to
physicians. There are some common criticisms of these relationships, discussed in detail below.
Industry funding leads to non-disclosure of negative results:
Industry-sponsored trials are less likely to be published. For instance, Bourgeois found
that they were also less likely to have been published within 24 months of study completion
(32.4%, compared to 56.2% of nonprofit or nonfederal funded trials without industry
collaborators) (Bourgeois 2010). This is a concern, as negative results should be relevant for
treating patients. For example, one meta-analysis of SSRIs found them safe and effective;
another one that took into account unpublished and published data concluded the opposite. One
study found that seven industry-sponsored reviews recommended the experimental drug, while
none of the Cochrane Collaboration reviews did. Another found that meta-analysis conducted by
individuals with financial ties to a single company were not more likely than other individuals to
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have results that favored the sponsor's drug; however, they were more likely to have favorable
conclusions (NRC).
Industry-funded trials tend to be more likely to publish positive outcomes (Bourgeois
2010). A study of 332 randomized controlled trials published in 13 journals found that the
industry funded trials were more likely to be associated with a pro-industry finding. Another
analysis that focused solely on the journal Spine found that studies with industry funding were
1.6 times more likely to report positive results than studies with funding from other sources.
(White 2007) 1998 study found a strong association between author's positions on calcium-
channel antagonists and financial ties to industry. A more recent Canadian study found that
"industry-funded trials are more likely to be associated with statistically significant pro-industry
findings, both in medical trials and surgical intervention." This has been repeated by several
other studies (Caulfield 2007).
In June 2011, The Spine Journal devoted a whole issue to a series of letters by spine
specialists publically repudiating research by other experts that backed the use of a Medtronic
bone growth product. At the heart of the issue were side effects that emerged in initial trials,
which were considered by the FDA during review. However, researchers of studies sponsored by
Medtronic after approval claimed these side effects were not seen in their patients (Meier and
Wilson).
One famous case involved a company trying to suppress a principal investigator from
disclosing negative side effects seen in a study. Dr. Olivieri, a hematologist at the Hospital for
Sick Children, ran a clinical trial studying deferiprone for the treatment of thalassemia. After
several years of clinical trials, in 1995, she became concerned the drug was not effective; later,
she also became concerned that the drug might be causing liver fibrosis in patients. She reported
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these concerns to Apotex Inc, the Canadian pharmaceutical manufacturer sponsoring the
research, but Apotex disagreed with her conclusions, and felt there was no need to inform
patients. Dr. Olivieri informed the Research Ethics Board, and was instructed to revise the
existing protocols and consent forms to inform patients of the risk. When Apotex received the
revised forms, they stopped the trial and informed Dr. Olivieri that she was not permitted to
disclose any information about her trials, as it would violate confidentiality and would make her
subject to legal action. This became a highly publicized controversy when it was revealed that
Apotex was in discussions with the University of Toronto to make a multimillion dollar donation
to the university for the construction of a new biomedical research center and to the teaching
hospitals, the largest donation ever received by the university (Baylis). In 1998, Dr. Olivieri
published in the New England Journal of Medicine that "deferiprone does not adequately control
iron burden in patients with thalassemia and may worsen hepatic fibrosis" (Olivieri 1998).
This issue has continued to be highly controversial, with some arguing that her research
was not scientifically sound and that the publicity surrounding it delayed the launch of the drug
in the US, with the result of many children's deaths (Shuchman). Deferiprone was approved in
August 1999 in Europe, but was not approved in the US until October 2011. The FDA review
states that the original NDA was rejected because of issues with "clinical data, clinical
pharmacology data, chemistry, manufacturing and control and a failed facility inspection" and
recommended that the manufacturer conduct a prospective randomized controlled trial based on
their recommendations. This additional multi-center study, along with data from clinical trials
performed by independent investigators and peer-reviewed publications, was accepted. The
reviewers also state that "The scientific issue of progression or development of hepatic fibrosis
with deferiprone use was first raised in a New England Journal of Medicine article in 1998.
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However, this finding has not been consistently observed in other published studies. Review of
scientific literature reveals that hepatic fibrosis can be observed in the setting of thalassemia with
iron overload and/or hepatitis C without use of deferiprone so determining causality in this
patient population is difficult. Post-European Union approval, few cases of hepatoxicity have
been reported" (FDA review). On the other hand, the Public Citizen's Health Research Group
published a letter sent to the FDA on October 2011 (before the NDA was approved), stating that
the data "were grossly insufficient and fail to demonstrate that deferiprone is safe and effective
in the intended population" (Public Citizen).
Industry funding risks endangering patient care:
Non-disclosure of consulting agreements has raised concerns physicians are improperly
prescribing medications due to financial incentives. There have been a number of recent scandals
at academic medical centers.
For example, the 1999 death of Jesse Gelsinger at the University of Pennsylvania raised
concerns, as the university had officials with financial interests in the company sponsoring the
study (NRC). In 2005, the Cleveland Clinic was revealed to own 4.1% of AtriCure, the maker of
equipment used in over 1,200 patients in the previous four years (Armstrong 2005). In 2008 a
congressional investigation found that a child psychiatrist at Harvard had failed to disclose that
he had received $1.6 million in consulting fees over a two-year period from a drug company that
made an anti-psychotic he had been prescribing (O'Connor 2010). In the same year the chair of
the Psychiatry Department at Emory University resigned after it was revealed that he failed to
disclose substantial consulting payments from pharmaceutical companies, violating university
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and federal rules (and exceeding university rules that he limit payments) (National Research
Council).
Pharmaceutical companies often promote their products by having sales representatives
visit physicians. In 2004, about $21 billion was spent on this. Some have argued that these
interactions are unnecessary and that companies unduly influence physicians through visits and
small gifts; however, others argue that vital information is exchanged. Recently, there has been
concern that industry is unduly influencing physicians. In 1998, Roughead et al. stated that "The
provision of gifts by sales personnel encourages an automatic response of indebtedness on the
part of the receiver who will then look for ways to make repayment" (NRC). One study of 32
academic and community physicians in San Diego, Atlanta and Chicago found that physicians
were influenced by sales representatives, and that conflict of interest is created (Chimonas,
Brennan and Rothman, 2007 as cited in Chressanthis).
A number of recent scandals have been in the news inappropriate marketing of physician
prescribing. Recent DOJ settlements have hit the billion mark.: GlaxoSmithKline agreed recently
to pay $3 billion, Pfizer paid $2.3 billion to settle claims on Bextra, Abbott paid $1.5 million,
Lilly paid $1.4 billion to settle sales of Zyprexa and Merck paid $950 million and pled guilty to
illegally promoting Vioxx (Coffrey and Law, Whistleblower). Many smaller claims have also
been in the news recently: Bayer $110 million for Yaz (2012); Warner-Lambert $430 million, for
Neurontin (2004); J&J $158M for Risperdal (2012); Orphan Medical Inc. $20 million, for
Xyrem (2007); and Merck and Co. Inc. $58 million Vioxx (2008) and $650 million for
overcharging Medicaid for three popular drugs. The DOJ accused the companies of paying
"consulting" fees, sponsoring "medical education", and providing "educational grants" all solely
as marketing tools to increase prescribing. Medical device companies likewise have been in the
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spotlight for inappropriate medical marketing: In 2006, Medtronic paid $40 million to settle
charges with the DOJ, and in 2007 four major orthopedic device manufacturers (Zimmer, Dupuy,
Biomet and Smith and Nephew) paid $311 million to settle allegations. All companies adopted
integrity agreements as part of the settlement (NRC).
However, there is clearly information exchanged, which may be valuable for physicians.
For example, Chressanthis et al. used an IMS database of 72 thousand physicians, looking at
prescribing of a novel first-in-class pharmaceutical, an existing product that received negative
clinical trials results, and an existing agent that received a black-box warning based on whether
or not their institutions imposed restrictions on sales reps. The authors found that physicians
with more restricted access were slower to prescribe the new drug, but were also slower to
reduce prescribing of the drugs with new clinical information/a black box warning
(Chressanthis). For medical devices, the picture is more complex. With complicated devices,
sales people provide training, equipment calibration, and expertise and advice related to use of
the device. For instance, the ACCULINK Carotid Stent System was only approved by the FDA
with an appropriate training program (in which physicians would be trained by company
representatives) (FDA PMA).
More recently, there has been concern about industry influence on clinical guidelines,
thus impacting patient care. One study looking at clinical guidelines reported that 56 percent of
498 individuals surveyed had a conflict of interest, usually by being a consultant or advisor to a
company in that therapeutic space (Mendelson 2011). One particularly famous case of this is
with kidney dialysis guidelines. Amgen, the manufacturer of epoetin (which increases
hemoglobin in dialysis patients) was the primary sponsor of the Kidney and Dialysis Outcomes
Quality Initiative, which issued guidelines in 2006 recommending an increase in the target
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hemoglobin levels (thus entailing higher doses of epoetin). Of the 16 people involved in drafting
the requirements, 14 received some form of payment from a company potentially affected by the
guidelines (Coyne 2007). In 2011, Medicare opted to disregard these guidelines, by removing a
requirement that dialysis providers keep hemoglobin above the minimum (Reuters 2011). More
recently, the FDA was urged to reconsider its decision to allow Yaz to remain on the market after
it was revealed that four of the twenty-six members of the expert panel whose recommendation
the FDA followed had ties to the pharmaceutical manufacturer - relevant because the panel had
decided by a four-vote margin and all four had voted in favor (Yukhananov 2012).
"You can't have a panel with expertise in the area that doesn't have
some kind of conflicts,"
--Dr. Denise Simons-Morton, responsible for assembling cardiovascular guideline group
(Wilson)
2.2 Benefits of Industry-Academic Relationships
Collaboration between academic medical centers and companies can yield innovative
new therapeutics. For example, collaborations led to a better understanding of the development
of new classes of: drugs to treat HIV; a monoclonal antibody against the platelet glycoprotein
lIb/IIla; pulmonary surfactant which improves neonatal survival; rituximab, a monoclonal
antibody effective against lymphomas; bortezomib, a protease inhibitor effective against multiple
myeloma; and imatinib, a tyrosine kinase inhibitor effective against CML (NRC).
Historically, half of all biotechnology firms were founded by university scientists, most
of whom retained academic appointments post-founding. In 2003, more than 70% of papers
published by biotechnology firms were coauthored with a scientist in academia (Stuart 2007).
One study found that more than half of papers referenced on drug patents between 1993 and
1994 belonged to academic researchers. (2-Campbell 2004). Another found that 27 percent of
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new products commercialized by drug companies in the 1980s would have encountered long
development delays without academic research. This was found to be true even though only 10-
15 percent of drug discoveries are made at universities; the authors conclude that "academic
research often results in findings that are necessary but not sufficient for the discovery or
improvement of a drug. Industrial R&D must be carried out to extend, supplement and focus the
findings of the academic R&D" (Mansfield 1991). When this research was repeated from 1986-
1994, the percentage increased to 31 percent - the greatest out of all the industries studied
(Mansfield 1998).
A 1994-1995 survey of over 2,000 life science faculty found that those with industry
funding published more than faculty without industry funding (2-Campbell 2004). Furthermore,
a 1996 survey found that faculty with industry funding were more likely to have applied for a
patent, had a patent licensed, had a product under review or on the market, or started a company
than those without funding (Blumenthal 1996). In a 2009 survey of 1663 researchers at academic
medical centers, 51.9% had some relationship with industry and 40.7% said that this relationship
contributed to their most important scientific work (Zinner 2009).
One study, which looked at reports published between 1979 and 1983 in six top basic
science journals, found that the "strongest predictor of moving to randomized [clinical]
experimentation was industry involvement in the original basic science publication" (Ionnidis).
The importance of these collaborations is more profound for medical devices, which have
a more continuous process of innovation that requires many innovations on the original
prototype. Some examples of medical devices that have evolved from close academic and
industry ties include implanted defibrillators, prosthetic heart valves, mechanical ventilators,
pulse oximetry, and phototherapy (NRC). However, there is concern that consulting
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arrangements that do not result in significant device rearrangement may simply be inducements
for physicians to use their device.
It is rare to find officials who do not have some sort of relationship with a company, and
that "it is likely that limiting the ability of senior officials to interact with industry would reduce
the transfer of scientific resources to and from the commercial sector." Officials at top research
centers felt that their commercial relationships supported the educational mission, despite the
risks of conflicts of interest. In two of the four institutions in which a substantial amount of
clinical research was conducted, the authors found no examples of conflicts of interest (Campbell
2004a).
2.3 Further Discussion
Medical marketing legislation seeks to restrict pharmaceutical and medical device
companies from improperly influencing physicians (by avoiding and/or disclosing gifts and
financial arrangements). Some argue that these are onerous on the companies, but will not impact
innovation because most concept ideation occurs in a small minority of physicians, sometimes
called "key thought leaders." However, conflict-of-interest regulation at universities is likely to
impact this relationship.
For example, despite the share of academic patents increasing, in 2003 the share of
faculty members from clinical departments who held patents was only 3.5% (Azoulay 2007).
The top 20 universities obtain 83% of the aggregate net returns generated from licenses (Bulut
and Moschini 2006). As part of the DOJ settlement, the medical device companies agreed to
disclose the names of all physicians and the amounts paid to them. One key finding from this
data is that the physicians that received payments in 2007 represent only about 4% of orthopedic
surgeons (Steinbrook 2011).
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Restrictions that makes collaborations more difficult could do so either directly (e.g. by
being unduly burdensome for either physicians or companies) or indirectly (e.g. by stigmatizing
physician relationships with funding). For instance, editors sometimes will not accept review
articles by authors that disclose financial interests, out of concern of their being influenced by
those interests. In addition, some studies suggest readers are less likely to consider research
interesting and believable if they know that the author had financial ties to a company (NRC). In
1996, 30% of life science companies surveyed reported that conflict-of-interest rules were
causing difficulty collaborating (Blumenthal 1996). This is likely higher today since stricter
conflict of interest policies are continuously emerging.
2.4 Research Question
Research to-date that has sought to illustrate the negative impact of conflict-of-interest
rules has primarily been survey-based. A more quantitative approach may provide greater
support for the argument that there are benefits to less strict conflict-of-interest rules, and to
better understand the impact of tightening rules. My approach focused on using clinical trial data
to quantify the impact of conflict of interest rules on clinical trials performed.
3. Methods and Research Design
3.1 Approach
My approach to assessing the impact of COI restrictions is to use an econometric framework
to estimate the impact of each school's change in restrictions by level of clinical trials (e.g.
comparing the pre-and post-policy trial trends), compared to institutions that did not have a
change in restriction-level.
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This approach is based on a number of assumptions. First, I assume clinical trials are a
measure of clinical translation. It may be argued that clinical trials are a poor proxy for this. In
addition, it assumes that the trials are initiated at a specific point in time. For this analysis, I
assume the impact of COI restrictions is felt in trials initiated in the following year. This may not
be accurate. Next, I assume that institutional mechanisms determine how physician inventors
transition research from the lab into the clinic. Finally, I assume that COI interventions that
change the institutional environment for scientific research will be reflected in the ability to
move compounds into the clinic, which will be captured by clinical trials. This analytical
framework relies on the fact that institutional changes induce changes in the number of programs
moved into the clinic relative to baseline levels.
3.2 Dataset Construction
I used the following data sources to construct my dataset: clinicaltrials.gov, the AMSA
scoreboard, NIH funding (report.nih.gov), hospital discharges and gross patient revenue
(ahd.com), and faculty number (usnews.com).
I used clinical trials as a measure of innovativeness, understanding that clinical trials are key
to the successful transition of innovation from the bench to bedside. The US Government
mandated that a database be created by the NIH for clinical trials with the 1997 FDA
Modernization Act (McCray 2000, FDA). Registration with this database (clinicaltrials.gov)
became widespread in 2005, because in September 2004, the members of the International
Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) stated it would only consider a trial for
publication if it had been registered before the enrollment of the first patient (beginning July 1,
2005). Studies currently in progress at that time were allowed until September 2005 to register
(De Angelis 2005). All trials began to be reported in 2007, since the US Public Law 110-85
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(Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 or FDAAA), Title VIII, Section 801,
passed on September 27, 2007, required that all clinical trials be registered on clinicaltrials.gov.
Compliance with the law is necessary to achieve both NIH funding and FDA approval (NIH).
I used AMSA scoreboards as an independent assessment of the strict conflict-of-interest
rules. To achieve this, the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) and the Institute
of Medicine published guidelines in 2008 and 2009. The American Medical Student Association
began publishing "PharmFree Scorecards" in 2007, which graded medical schools on their COI
policies. Over the years, this has been refined with help from The Pew Prescription Project. As
part of this, each school's policy is rated based on criteria described in Appendix (AMSA).
These scores were used to rate the severity of COI rules, with a score of A or B corresponding to
a "high" level of restriction. Schools with C or lower were considered not high, or base. Since
this was first published in 2007, I had to extrapolate scores for 2006.
My complete dataset included 566,811 sites included in 50,769 clinical trials. I identified the
top 150 zipcodes by number of sites, and from these identified 80 AMCs (matching zipcode with
an accredited medical school. If there was no AMC within 30 minute drive, I excluded that
zipcode from the dataset). Many AMCs corresponded to multiple zipcodes; in this situation, all
were included. A few zipcodes had multiple institutions within a 30 minute drive; when this
occurred, I selected the closest AMC. See full list in Appendix.
For this analysis, I only used clinical trials at these 80 medical schools from 2006 to 2011.
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4. Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
There are two large trends in the data that are important to note. First, clinical trials
increase from 2005 to 2008. Second, the share of AMCs with strict COI regulations increases
over this time.
Looking at all centers, the number of clinical trials increases from 4,290 in 2005 to peak
at 5,887 in 2008, and then declines 19% to 4,791 in 2011.
Figure 2: Clinical Trials at Top 80 AMCs in the United States, from 2005-2011
There are a few possible explanations for the decline of clinical trials overall. First, it
may be the case that some trials were not included for 2011; however, the analysis was updated
with the dataset in July 2012. Second, generic macroeconomic factors have influenced the
pharmaceutical industry, with funding overall declining. Since trials have about a year lead-time,
economic challenges in 2008 would be seen in 2009. In addition, the Affordable Care Act,
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passed in March 2010, has created some uncertainty in the industry, and there have been a
number of patent cliffs in 2010 at major companies that may have resulted in less funding for
clinical development. In addition, there has been an overall trend towards moving clinical trials
abroad, which may have accelerated in the last few years due to budget constraints. This would
reflect fewer trials, as my analysis only considers US trials.
The share of AMCs with restrictive COI policies (defined as a C or below by AMSA)
was initially 36.2% in 2008, when the first AMSA scoreboard was published. This increased
to 73.8% in 2011. In other words, three years ago strict COI rules characterized a minority of
institutions - today, it is the vast majority (nearly three-fourths).
Figure 3: Breakdown of Top 80 AMCs by COI Restrictiveness Level, from 2008-2011
Overall, AMCs with restrictive AMCs have higher numbers of clinical trials (77 vs.
62). This may be due to the fact that more prestigious/larger AMCs have both more clinical
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trials, and stricter COI rules. To examine this, I focused on 14 universities that received over
$200 million in NIH funding in 2012.
Table 2: AMCs that Received Over $200M in NIH Funding in 2012
Rank School NIH Funding
1 Harvard $ 434,745,756
2 Hopkins $ 395,351,096
University of
3 Washington $ 307,035,131
4 UCSF $ 303,909,201
University of
5 Pennsylvania $ 299,842,143
University of
6 Michigan $ 286,139,603
University of
7 Pittsburgh $ 271,239,804
8 UCSD $ 270,348,537
9 Yale $ 252,343,786
Washington
10 University $ 251,319,322
11 UCLA $ 245,485,802
12 Duke $ 232,793,621
13 Columbia $ 208,724,131
14 Stanford $ 203,463,786
These universities had, on average, about twice as many clinical trials as those with
less NIH funding (116, vs. 58 in 2011), and this was consistent over time.
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Figure 4: Clinical Trials Conducted at High NIH Funding AMCs (>$200M) vs. Low NIH,
2006-2011
High-NIH AMCs were more likely than to have strict rules in 2005. This trend
consisted over time, with 64% of high-NIH AMCs having strict COI rules in 2005,
increasing to 100% in 2011; in contrast, 24% of low-NIH AMCs had strict COI rules in
2005, increasing to 64% in 2011. Both groups tightened COI rules over time.
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Consequently, the number of clinical trials was positively correlated to stricter COI
rules. However, it is important to note that more prestigious AMCs (as suggested by greater
NIH funding) have both stricter COIs and more clinical trials.
4.2 Economic evaluation of impact of COI regulation
I began by estimated the relationship between AMC and number of trials using an Ordinary
Least Square Regression.
The empirical model takes the form
T = Po + PfiCOIhigh + @2Start + $3NIH + $ 4faculty + s
Where trials at each AMC, T, is linearly related to:
e COI high: A dummy variable, 1 if high level of restriction, 0 if not
e Start: the number of trials conducted in 2005, the year before my analysis begins, to
control for the significant differences in size of institutions
e NIH funding: another control variable, which represents both the size and level of
scientific and clinical research the institution engages in, and indirectly may measure
prestige
e Faculty: the number of faculty at each institution, which reflects the size
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With this regression, the coefficients are in the expected direction, except for faculty
(which has an extremely small negative impact). Start and NIH both have expected positive
coefficients, with significance. Restrictive COI policies have a negative coefficient, but no
significance.
Table 3: Impact of Variables on Number of Trials, Linear Regression
Variable Coefficient Sign.
COILhigh -1.25819
start 1.201969 ***
nih 3.14E-08 ***
faculty -0.00121 **
Coefficients are significant at the 10-percent level (*), the 5-percent level (**), or the 1-
percent level (***).
Seeing the large impact of the starting number of trials in the regression, a logarithmic
model seemed more accurate than a linear one:
log (T) = Po + PICOIhigh + p2 log(start)+ $3 log(NIH) + p4log(faculty) + S
With this model, the coefficients are directional and significance is achieved for all
variables except faculty. Based on this analysis, restrictive vs. non-restrictive COI rules results in
9.4% less clinical trials. This impact was slightly greater with high-NIH institutes or 11.5% less.
In 2011, the average number of clinical trials conducted was 116, so this suggests that by having
highly restrictive COI rules the institution conducted 13 less clinical trials
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Table 4: Impact of Variables on Number of Trials, Logarithmic Regression
All AMCs High-NmH Low-NmH AMCs
________ ~~AMCs __ ____ __
Variable Coefficient Sign. Coefficient Sign. Coefficient Sign.
CO1 high -0.0984 -0.12221 * -0.10219 **
log-start 0.9290 1.039227 *** 0.910163 ***
log-nih 0.0734 -0.21895 0.090357 ***
log-faculty -0.0305 -0.04029 -0.03645
Coefficients are significant at the 10-percent level (*), the 5-percent level (**), or the 1-
percent level (***).
Next, I added to this equation fixed effects by year. The year impact is, unsurprisingly,
quite large, with a greater impact than COI. This makes sense, since we see in aggregate that the
overall number of trials has been declining. However, the coefficient and significance on
COIlow persists even with these year fixed effects.
Table 5: Impact of Variables on Number of Trials, Logarithmic Regression
Variable Coefficient Sign.
COIhigh -0.05322 *
log-start 0.926317
log-nih 0.06937
log-faculty -0.03172 *
y06 0.17438
y07 0.189568
y08 0.250349 ***
y09 0.110308 **
y10 0.15142
Coefficients are significant at the
the 1-percent level (***).
10-percent level (*), the 5-percent level (**), or
Finally, I added in fixed effects by AMC. Control variables are excluded, as fixed effects
per institution already achieve these controls. The coefficients are directional, and significance is
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achieved. Shifting from high to low levels of restriction decreases the number of trials by 13.2%
on a per-institution level.
Table 6: Impact of COI change on a Per-institution Level, Log Function
Variable Coefficient I Sign.
COI_high -.1417292 ***
Coefficients are significant at the 10-percent level (*), the 5-percent level (**), or
the 1-percent level (***).
Even though all AMCs had a decrease in trials overall, the decrease for AMCs with COI
change was on average 12% vs. 8% for AMCs that did not tighten AMCs.
Table 7: Impact of COI Change in Aggregate
Indexed Trials
I 70.5
Before After
AMCs w/ coi Change
(n=33)
A 0
Pre-2010 Post-2010
AMCs w/o Cot Change
(n=46)
However, when I also added in fixed effects per year the impact disappears. The year
impact drowns out the COI impact, so it no longer achieves significance.
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Table 8: Impact of Variables on Number of Trials, Logarithmic Regression
Variable Coefficient Sign.
COILhigh -0.0093
y06 0.1945 ***
y07 0.2069 ***
y08 0.2705 ***
y09 0.1313 ***
y10 0.1574 ***
Coefficients are significant at the 10-percent level (*), the 5-percent level (**), or
the 1-percent level (***).
5. Conclusion
This paper presented a detailed analysis of the impact of conflict-of-interest regulation at
academic medical centers. My results suggest a decline of clinical trials at institutions that
implemented strict COI regulations, relative to universities that have less strict regulations.
This decline persisted despite controls based on initial number of trials, number of faculty,
NIH funding, and patient revenues.
It is important to note that clinical trials is a poor proxy for innovation and scientific
translation. However, seeing an impact on such a high level suggests that this impact would
be even more noteworthy if a more nuanced proxy was evaluated instead.
This analysis provides the first econometric assessment of the highly controversial COI
policies that have been implemented. This evaluation of this changing policy environment
addresses and clarifies a series of debates among policy-makers. While there is a clear need
to protect students and patients, such conflict-of-interest legislation is associated with lower
number of clinical trials, and perhaps poorer translation of scientific innovations into the
clinic and hopefully ultimately to patients.
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There is a key question that should be addressed by future research: whether trials merely
shifted to institutions with less restrictive policies (suggesting they were initiated by external
parties, such as industry) or whether they failed to take place (suggesting that endogenous
physician-scientists were crucial catalysts). Due to the importance of physician-inventors in
scientific innovation, and partnerships with industry to drive research from the lab into the
clinic and eventually to patients, this is important to understand further.
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Appendix
Trial information
All Trials
Variable Obs Mean St Dev Mm Max
trials 480 68.46 90.88189 4.OOE+00 560
start 480 53.625 73.91832 5 428
1.01E+0 1.OOE+0 4.35E+0
nih 480 8 8 0 8
faculty 480 1849.875 1559.188 39 11817
COIhigh 480 0.414583 0.493164 0 1
AMCs with NIH > 200M
Variable Obs Mean St Dev Min Max
trials 84 116.3333 106.7849 8.OOE+00 453
start 84 90.78571 83.62842 9 341
2.83E+0 6.30E+0 4.35E+O
nih 84 8 7 203000000 8
faculty 84 3046.786 2637.192 853 11817
COI high 84 0.738095 0.442312 0 1
AMCSs with NIH <200M_________ 
_____
Variable Obs Mean St Dev Min Max
trials 396 58.30556 83.83996 4.00E+00 560
start 396 45.74242 69.28451 5 428
6.22E+0 5.34E+0 1.96E+0
nih 396 7 7 0 8
faculty 396 1595.985 1057.068 39 4705
COI high 396 0.34596 0.476282 0 1
AMSA Scorecard
Policies are rated on each of the domains listed below, using the following general format.
3 = Model policy
2= Good progress toward model policy
1 = Policy is absent or unlikely to have a substantial effect on behavior
0 = Institutions that do not respond to requests for policies or decline to participate will
receive scores of zero in every category.
1. Gifts and individual financial relationships with industry
lA. Gifts (including meals)
41
Background: Numerous published studies demonstrate that small and large gifts play a role
in influencing prescribing decisions, which directly affect patients. Medical personnel
consistently underestimate the extent to which they personally are influenced. Industry-
sponsored meals are a form of gifting.
3 = All gifts and on-site meals funded by industry are prohibited, regardless of nature or
value.
2= Less stringent limitation on industry-funded gifts (e.g., gifts prohibited above $50/year -
or gifts prohibited but meals allowed)
1 = No policy, or policy that would not substantially reduce gifting (e.g., gifts are allowed
but discouraged, or limited in a non-specific way to "appropriate," or primarily for the
benefit of patients).
1B. Consulting relationships (excluding scientific research and speaking)
3 = Consulting relationships with industry must be subjected to institutional review or
approval. Additionally, they must either be described in a formal contract, or payment for
services must be commensurate to the task.
2= As above, without the institutional review or approval requirement.
1 = No policy, or policy that would allow consulting relationships to occur without
institutional scrutiny or that would allow relationships in which payments are not
commensurate with work.
IC. Industry-funded speaking relationships
Background: Research relationships with industry may entail beneficial public presentations
and speeches by individual researchers. However, industry also uses academic physicians to
support marketing goals by identifying and cultivating speakers who give a positive message
about the drug in question. Such ongoing relationships, sometimes called "speakers bureaus,"
are unnecessary and detrimental.
3 = Speaking relationships are prevented from functioning as de facto gifts or marketing. An
effective policy must not implicitly permit (a) long-term speaking agreements or (b) industry
to have a role in determining presentation content. (Some effective policies may explicitly
prohibit participation in a speakers bureau. Other effective policies contain elements such as
limits on compensation and reimbursement and a requirement to ensure the scientific
integrity of information presented.)
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2 = Industry-funded speaking relationships are regulated, but with less stringent limits on
longevity, content or compensation.
1 = No policy, or policy that does not define the limits on longevity, content or
compensation.
1D. Disclosure
3 = Personnel are required to disclose past and present financial ties with industry (e.g.,
consulting and speaking agreements, research grants) on a publicly-available website and/or
disclose such relationships to patients when such a relationship might represent an apparent
conflict of interest.
2 = Universally-required, internal disclosure to the medical school or hospital administration.
(Policies requiring disclosure only when presenting or publishing do not meet this criterion.)
1 = No policy.
2. Pharmaceutical Samples
Background: The U.S. pharmaceutical industry distributes some $18 billion per year in drug
samples. Published studies show that a substantial proportion of these samples are used by
physicians, staff and their families. Such use is a clear financial conflict of interest that
confers no possible benefit on patients.
When sample medications are accepted and dispensed in the clinic setting, the usual
standards of inventory control, drug interaction and dosage screening, labeling and
documentation may be bypassed (contravening Joint Commission standards for hospital
accreditation). Distribution of non-formulary drug samples has the potential to undermine the
intent and function of the formulary.
Furthermore, the distribution of samples has been shown to lead physicians to prescribe
drugs that differ from their preferred drug choice, reducing their prescribing of unadvertised
drugs in favor of advertised drugs and decreasing their use of first-line (relative to second-
line) therapies. This implies that the direct distribution of samples to physicians may, in
aggregate, increase costs while reducing the safety and effectiveness of prescribing.
3 = Industry samples are prohibited, except under certain narrow circumstances approved by
the institution that protect the interests of patients and prevent the use of samples as a
marketing tool (e.g., policies that allow samples under limited circumstances with the
approval of the Pharmacy and Therapeutics (P&T) Committee or policies that incorporate
samples into a larger program designed to ensure the availability of brand-name and generic
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medications to under-insured patients; if the circumstances of the specific program are not
defined, the policy should define the approvals process). Where there is a specific program in
place, the policy must prevent samples from being given directly to physicians by
pharmaceutical sales representatives.
2 = Samples or vouchers for medications may be provided, but with significant limitations
(e.g., samples may not be given directly to physicians, samples must be dispensed or
controlled by the pharmacy department).
1 = No policy, or a policy that does not substantially limit the use of samples (e.g., samples
limited to formulary items, or samples not for personal use).
3. Purchasing & Formularies
Background: Individuals with financial conflicts of interest should not make institutional
purchasing decisions. Decisions influenced by personal conflicts have the potential to
adversely affect institutional costs and the quality of patient care. Pharmacy and Therapeutics
(P&T) Committees typically decide which drugs will be on the hospital's "preferred list,"
known as a formulary. Other committees may make other purchasing decisions.
3 = Formulary committees and committees overseeing purchases of medical devices should
exclude those who have financial relationships with drug or device manufacturers. Exclusion
may be specific to participation in particular decisions for which the staff member has a
conflict of interest. This policy does not prevent expert clinicians from advising a committee,
provided that potential conflicts are disclosed. (Note: this standard is not intended to prohibit
indirect financial interests, such as investments in mutual funds that may own pharmaceutical
company shares).
2 = Less stringent policies that do not prohibit individuals with conflicts from participating in
purchasing decisions (e.g., policies that require members of committees overseeing purchases
merely to disclose potential conflicts of interest).
1 = No policy, or policy that merely cautions against conflicts of interest.
4. Industry Sales Representatives
Background: Industry sales representatives are employed to increase the sales of their
company's drugs. Permitting their access to medical staff is not in the interests of patients or
staff.
3 = Pharmaceutical and device representatives are not allowed to meet with faculty
regardless of location, or are not permitted to market their products anywhere inside the
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medical center and associated clinics and offices. (Exceptions may be made for non-
marketing purposes, such as training on devices or equipment.)
2 = Pharmaceutical representatives are permitted to meet with faculty, but with significant
limitations (e.g., only in non-patient care areas or only by appointment). Exceptions as above.
1 = No policy, or policy that does not substantially limit access.
5. Education
Background: It is essential that financial support not influence the content of educational
activities. Where financial support from industry assists in the delivery of educational
activities, it must not be linked to an individual company's interest in promoting specific
products. Therefore, a firewall should separate the donor from those developing the
educational activity.
Educational activities take place both "on-site" (that is, within the medical school or hospital
campus) and "off-site" (at outside facilities, including professional conferences). Many
policies distinguish between on-site and off-site activities.
5A. On-site Educational Activities
3 = Industry is not permitted to provide direct financial support for educational activities,
including Continuing Medical Education (CME), directly or through a subsidiary agency.
(However, companies may contribute unrestricted funds to a central fund or oversight body
at the academic medical center, which, in turn, would pool and disburse funds for programs
that are independent of any industry input or control.)
2 = Less stringent limitations to ensure independence of educational content (e.g., standards
to establish freedom from industry influence of content, such as review and approval of
presentations; language that prevents industry from selecting the speaker; a requirement that
programs adhere to ACCME* standards; or language such as: industry funding may be
allocated for a particular topic, but must be provided directly to the department, not to
individuals). *Note: ACCME is a non-governmental oversight organization that establishes
accreditation standards for CME activities.
1 = No policy, or a policy that would not substantially limit industry influence over
educational activities (e.g., industry funding must be disclosed).
5B. Compensation for Travel or Attendance at Off-site Lectures & Meetings
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3 = Personnel may not accept payment, gifts or financial support from industry to attend
lectures and meetings. (An exception may be made for modest meals, if part of a larger
program.) Travel support may only be accepted if it is subject to institutional approval or
industry is prevented from selecting ("earmarking") the recipients. Note: speaking and
consulting relationships are evaluated separately in domain 1.
2 = Less stringent limitations.
1 = No policy, or a policy that would not substantially limit participation in industry-funded
events and meetings.
5C. Industry Support for Scholarships & Funds for Trainees
3 = The policy must either prevent industry from earmarking or awarding funds to support
the training of particular individuals (recipients must be chosen by the school or department),
or the policy must mandate institutional review of the giving of funds. (This does not
preclude grants that fund a specific research project.)
2 = Less stringent limitations.
1 = No policy, or a policy that would not substantially regulate industry funding of
scholarships and funds for trainees.
5D. Medical school curriculum (or other documentation of educational objectives/course
content)
3 = Students are trained to understand institutional conflict-of-interest policies and recognize
how industry promotion can influence clinical judgment.
2 = Curriculum addresses conflict of interest in a more limited way (e.g., training on policies
only).
1 = No policy (not addressed in curriculum or elsewhere).
6. Enforcement
A. Is it clear that there is a party responsible for general oversight to ensure compliance?
(Y/N)
B. Is it clear there are sanctions for noncompliance? (Y/N)
46
AMCs by ZipCode and Trials
# Zipcode # Trials Name
1 78229/77030 5,564 Baylor
2 02115/02114 3,817 Harvard
30322/30342/30
033/
30308/30060/30
3 309 3,461 Emory
60611/60612/60
4 614 2,951 Northwestern
92123/92103/92
037/
5 92108/92120 2,751 UCSD
90048/90027/90
211/
90404/91505/90
6 502 2,427 UCLA
7 63141/63110 2,396 Washington University
94305/94609/94
8 304 2,282 Stanford
9 19104 1,843 University of Pennsylvania
Indiana University-
10 46202/46260 1,817 Indianapolis
33143/33021/33
11 136 1,762 University of Miami
21205/21231/
12 21205/21224 1,681 Hopkins
92868/92801/92 University of California--
13 708 1,653 Irvine
98109/98104/
14 98105/98101 1,650 University Washington
32224/85259/
15 32207/32216 1,584 Mayo
75246/75231/
16 75230/75235 1,569 Utexas Southwestern
17 48202/48201 1,561 Wayne State University
18 15232/15213 University of Pittsburgh
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1,544
94115/93720/94
19 110 1,449 UCSF
20 10032 1,338 Columbia
21 60637 1,230 Uchicago
22 44106/44122 1,181 Case
23 48109 1,093 Umich
24 80218/80220 1,049 University of Colorado
25 55455/55404 1,031 University of Minnesota
University of California--
26 95817/95661 988 Davis
University of Arkansas for
27 72205 974 Medical Sciences
28 21201 941 University Maryland
29 45229/45219 939 University of Cincinnati
30 43210 923 OSU
31 33612/33613 899 University of South Florida
32 10029 885 MT. Sinai
33 52242 803 Iowa
34 10016 782 NYU
35 32806 768 University of Florida
Uniformed Services
University of the Health
36 20010 740 Sciences / VA Medical Center
37 10467/10461 709 Einstein
38 90033 697 USC
39 40202 695 University of Louisville
40 19107 686 Jefferson Medical College
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42 50309/50314 633 Des Moines University
43 85006/85712 599 University of Arizona
44 73104 593 Oklahoma State University
45 37203 579 Vanderbilt
46 27103 548 Wake Forest
Western University of Health
47 91010 546 Sciences
48 2118 493 Boston University
49 20007 482 Georgetown University
Medical College of
50 53226 472 Wisconsin
51 27705 437 Duke
University of Kansas Medical
52 67214 417 Center
53 60153 407 Loyola University
54 13210 401 SUNY--Syracuse
University of Hawaii--Manoa
55 96813 398 (Burns)
56 2111 394 Tufts University
Virginia Commonwealth
57 23298 376 University
University of Medicine and
Dentistry of New Jersey--
58 7601 370 Newark
59 70112 358 Tulane University
60 36608 351 University of South Alabama
University of Tennessee
61 38105 347 Health Science Center
University of Missouri--
62 64108 334 Kansas City
63 49503 Michigan State University
49
41 35209/35233 677 Alabama Birghamham
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64 2903 327 Brown
65 19111 321 Drexel University
Oregon Health and Science
66 97210 316 University
University of Nebraska
67 68131 313 Medical Center
Texas A&M Health Science
68 78705 310 Center
69 92354 308 Loma Linda University
Midwestern /Arizona College
70 85013 302 of Osteopathic Medicine
71 39216 296 University of Mississippi
72 12208 295 Albany Medical College
73 80204 290 Ucolorado
74 6510 286 Yale
75 68114 283 Creighton University
Eastern Virginia Medical
76 23507 277 School
University of North Texas
77 76104 275 Health Science Center
78 94598 252 Touro University California
79 73112 244 University of Oklahoma
Nova Southeastern
80 33308 242 University
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